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Abstract. This article aims to present the theoretical foundations of the classical political 
economy through the contributions of Adam Smith and David Ricardo and to find out how 
their neoclassical followers interpreted, evaluated, and transformed this classical theoretical 
basis. Specifically, we analyze from a critical point of view the neoclassical interpretation of 
globalization by arguing that this theorization is probably insufficient in analytical terms. 
We conclude that an analytical counterproposal for the relative explanatory insufficiencies 
of the neoclassical synthesis is based on the modern evolutionary approach of globalization. 
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1. Introduction 
he structure of a connective theoretical understanding of the global 
capitalistic dynamics is not a simple matter, and it is not an issue of 
scientific “routine.” On the contrary, it seems to be the most 
complicated research topic of all modern socioeconomic disciplines: it is 
called upon theoretically to embrace our entire world, in all the structural 
and functional socioeconomic spheres. In this context, the analysis of the 
dynamics of globalization has already occupied a central position in 
modern economic theory and research (Geisler Asmussen, Pedersen, 
Devinney, & Tihanyi, 2011; Rubdy & Alsagoff, 2014; Veltmeyer, 2017). 
The study of economics during two and a half centuries or so that has a 
scientific character, never used and built upon unanimously accepted 
analytical bases. It maintains and reproduces its multiplicity and 
heterogeneity. According to Polanyi (2000, p. 1): “the community of scientists 
is organized in a way which resembles certain features of a body politic and works 
according to economic principles similar to those by which the production of  
material  goods  is regulated.” Therefore, in the effort to understand economic 
life, it seems that there has never been a single, completely dominant, 
theoretical paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) of the economic interpretation of 
capitalism. 
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Quite the contrary, the very problem of the transnational nature of 
capitalism is traditionally an area of relative “exaggerated” theoretical 
arguments at the heart of the economic discipline, in different ways and 
endings. For example, as Merkel (2014) wonders: “is capitalism compatible 
with the very concept of democracy?” Here they meet and intertwine, 
therefore, some of the critical aspects of the broader socioeconomic 
thought. The analysis of transnational capitalism involves and composes, at 
the same time, scientific, axiological, ideological, and political facets 
(Steger, 2005). 
We must, therefore, be prepared to try incessantly new theoretical 
projects and applications without ever underestimating the wealth of our 
accumulated knowledge which combines, on the one hand, the proper 
historical evidence and on the other hand, the history of our relative 
awareness, the very evolution of our theoretical perspective about them. 
Therefore, a very brief inquiry into the field of the fundamental thinking 
in economic science, which seeks the “variable meaning” of the world 
economy seems to have, in this effort, much to offer. In particular, we are 
going to discuss critically how the central axes of the classical and 
neoclassical theoretical traditions approach and study the dynamics of the 
world economy and what they offer in the discussion about globalization. 
As we will suggest in this article, the neoclassical tradition seems to be 
getting cut off progressively from the analytical and interpretative 
contributions of the classics, especially in the study of the capitalism 
externally of its strict ethnocentric outline. On the contrary, the modern 
approaches of evolutionary economics seem to offer some fertile theoretical 
answers in this neoclassical insufficiency. 
 
2. Aim and methodology of the paper 
Specifically, the aim of the article is, after studying the foundations of 
the classical political economy, to evaluate the theoretical continuity of 
classical economics, in what is generally called as neoclassical economics. 
Finally, it will end up with an evolutionary perspective of the dynamics of 
globalization. In the analysis that will follow, we will manage to examine 
only some of the necessary theoretical and methodological stations to 
understand the issue: 
i. In particular, the next section presents only the works of Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo and evaluates their contribution to the study 
of the international economy. Ιn our analysis we deliberately do not 
include the examination of Marx’s views, as this is a “very special” case: 
He is the last great classical economist and, at the same time, the first 
great non-classical, as his work brings a major breakthrough in 
economics, by drastically disrupting any conceptual continuity with the 
following neoclassical thinking in economics.  
ii. Subsequently, we will evaluate the theoretical background of the 
“followers” of classical economics by examining a scientific discourse 
that ended up with what is called neoclassical synthesis, and how they 
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interpret the phenomenon of globalization. Due to the limited size of 
this article, we will only critically refer to the most important aspects of 
the neoclassical synthesis that emerged from classical economics, 
leaving for future analysis both its connection to the Keynesian 
macroeconomics as well as the Marxist and neo-Marxist approach. 
iii. Finally, we will direct our investigation, through a critical stance 
towards neoclassical hypotheses, in the new theoretical streams of 
thought of the dynamics of globalization, especially from an 
evolutionary perspective. 
The following diagram illustrates this methodological effort (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. From the classical political economy, through the neoclassical synthesis, to the 
modern interpretations of global dynamics 
 
3. The classical political economy: The central 
perspectives of Adam Smith and David Ricardo 
In effect, the foundations of economic science lie on the classical political 
economy. This stream of thought is the common theoretical root of all the 
successive and antagonistic theoretical families-branches in the evolution of 
economic science. These also are the cradles of thought of microeconomic 
neoclassicism, which we will briefly examine subsequently, in the effort of 
seeking the necessary components of a solid understanding of global 
dynamics in economic terms. 
First, from the theoretical edifice of the classical political economy, one 
can discover the authentic principles of economic liberalism. Here, there is 
mainly a real source of the free scientific spirit, against every socioeconomic 
“established order,” which is against any state and private monopolization 
of wealth, potency, and power in every phase of the development of 
capitalism (Anquetil, 2019). Right here, one can understand how different 
the spirit of true liberalism is, as compared to its usual conservative and 
ethnocentric substitutes, which for the most part do not stop nowadays 
moving in a falsified way at a political and ideological level, as a 
supposedly called “liberalism.” 
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For the first time here, in the classical political economy, economic 
thinking (exceeding the pre-existing state-oriented mercantilist/commercial 
perceptions; Allen 1970) built systematically the theoretical foundations 
that led to the realization that there can be no limited capitalism within 
closed national boundaries. This theoretical section continues to have, until 
today, critical theoretical significance for a sound comprehension of 
globalization. 
Adam Smith, with his monumental work “The Wealth of Nations” in 
1776 (Smith, 1776), laid the foundations of economic science. A science as 
critical, fundamental, and necessary as hard and most of the time unfruitful 
judged, for two and a half centuries. 
In the background of the economic thought of A. Smith resides a 
grandiose philosophical “contradiction” (Smith, 1776, p.362):  
“Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most 
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is 
his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has 
in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather 
necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most 
advantageous to the society.” 
This undeviating empirical ascertainment is the basis for the engine of 
liberal thinking: the pursuit of individual benefit in a world of free-market 
transactions, free initiative, free choice, and competition leads to the 
common good. In conditions of freedom, without barriers and hierarchical 
compulsions, with opportunities for all and responsibility by all, the 
individual benefit necessarily converges with the social benefit –and in 
such circumstances does not exist and there can be no essential divergence 
between these two. 
For Smith, the underlying mechanism of capitalism that creates wealth 
consists of free competition, transactions, and a constant increase in labor 
productivity. In particular, the “secret” of productivity lies on the principle 
of the division of labor. The greater the division of labor is, the higher the 
productivity and more wealth. Adam Smith also underlined, with 
particular theoretical acumen, that the benefits from the division of labor 
remain always limited by the size of the market. The bigger the latter, the 
more advanced the social division of labor and profession and, therefore, 
the higher the productivity of labor and the wealth generated will be. 
Therefore, a broad market means more wealth. 
Based on this coherent, cyclically integrated logic, the principle of the 
division of labor can be further generalized and exceed the framework of 
the coordination of work within the factory. It extends beyond the 
laboratory, beyond the city or the periphery. It spreads, even beyond the 
nation-state. It outreaches national boundaries to become the basis of the 
international division of labor (Lim, 2017) at an international scale: 
according to A. Smith, this is how nations produce wealth. In the 
transnational dimension of A. Smith’s approach, therefore, the various 
national economies, in a way, substitute the workers in the division of 
individual production roles to result in the international division of labor. 
C. Vlados, JEPE, 6(3), 2019, p.257-280. 
260 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
Thus, the “simple assertion” of higher productivity and, accordingly, more 
profit, can only make capitalism, by its nature, to overflow its national 
framework. After all, the only way out of the stagnation state, for every 
national capitalist economy, is the foreign trade and the expanding 
international market, assisted by technological progress (Aspromourgos, 
2010; Brugger & Gehrke, 2018). 
In this meaning, the “law of absolute advantage” emerges in 
international trade, while Smith justifies, for the first time with integrated 
theoretical reasoning, the total benefit resulting from the international 
transactions. The fundamental rationale of this theoretical figure is as 
simple as evident: since each production system (on an individual or 
national level) becomes more productive when specialized, it would be 
better if everyone dealt with what could do more effectively. To produce 
what suits him, to be devoted to what has the ultimate advantage and to 
exchange his product in the market and thus altogether, as a whole (as a 
community or as an international society, respectively), can enjoy more 
than they would have available before the implementation of their 
production specialization (Heames, Crowley, & Sobel, 2010). 
At the country level, this means that since there is freedom in 
international transactions (the well-known “Laissez-faire et laissez-passer”) 
the capitalist process leads to the best possible use of available resources 
internationally. According to Smith (1776, p. 366):  
“Whether the advantages which one country has over another be 
natural or acquired, is in this respect of no consequence. As long as 
the one country has those advantages, and the other wants them, it 
will always be more advantageous for the latter rather to buy of the 
former than to make.” 
Moreover, let us insist on the most important: national production 
specialization deriving from the absolute advantage provides international 
trade that inevitably increases the total available wealth of the nations 
(Schumacher, 2012). Overall, this theoretical proposal, still today after more 
than two centuries, can hardly be questioned.  
Smith’s most eminent student, David Ricardo (1817), received then the 
analytical primacy over the theoretical problem of capitalism’s economy. 
He has shown that the result of the opening up of economies is not only 
advantageous to productivity growth but, in an even more critical way, it is 
the necessary condition for a seamless accumulation of capital. According 
to him, international transactions are, in the end, the key to productive 
investment and, accordingly, to capitalist economic growth itself. His 
conclusion was clear: there can be no capitalism without open international 
trade (Senga, Fujimoto, & Tabuchi, 2017). 
In particular, Ricardo suggested that if the English economy had not 
withdrawn the protectionist “corn laws,” then it would be doomed to 
stagnation (Salvadori & Signorino, 2015). He showed that, with high import 
tariffs, in practical terms with closed borders for imported wheat, the only 
ones who would continue to become richer were the domestic landowners. 
The workers would continue to vegetate (at the level of bare survival), and 
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capitalist-growers would lose any prospect of profit, and, at the same time, 
any incentive to expand their entrepreneurial activity further. 
In particular, he argued that, given that imports of corn are indirectly 
prohibited because of high tariffs, as wheat production is a strictly 
domestic issue and the cultivated English land is not as fertile everywhere, 
the “advantage” that the best pieces of land provide could only grow over 
time. Moreover, as the total employment of people and land will increase, 
competition among the growers-capitalists for renting land will intensify 
over time, too. This competition will always press the rent of the land 
upwards. The landowners will thus be distracting more and more of the 
production. Ultimately, the leftover from the production for the 
remuneration of work and capital-entrepreneurship –by taking away the 
always-rising land renting– will decrease from year to year. Taking also for 
granted that workers’ wages are “inherently” pinned to the level of 
survival, the only thing that could decrease –and, thus, it necessarily 
decreases– it is the profit of growers-capitalists. 
With this incessant suppression of profits, new investments would 
inevitably be doomed to decline: the “newborn” capitalism would die. It 
was going to die of suffocation: it would die because of the commercial 
protectionism and the grain-closed national English border. The solution, 
then, was to open the borders to imports of agricultural products that 
would reduce their prices in the domestic market. The less fertile soils 
would gradually be left out of the growing network, and the profit 
percentages of capitalism would be reborn (King, 2013). 
On this interpretative basis, D. Ricardo suggested the concept of 
comparative advantage (Costinot & Donaldson, 2012; Watson, 2017). 
According to his theoretical idea, which includes only two trading 
countries and two produced goods, even when one of the two countries is 
simultaneously in a disadvantaged situation in the production of both 
goods in absolute terms (when a higher amount of work for their 
production is required), then the international trade gives benefit to both 
trading countries. The least favored in the production of both goods can be 
specialized for its benefit, producing the good to which it is not inferior 
comparatively: even if it continues to be inferior in absolute terms, in the 
production of both. 
Of course, it is easy to understand that this finding is not entirely 
following A. Smith’s approach. Smith’s analysis of “absolute advantage” 
can lead to the meaning that it would be much more beneficial for the 
production of the two products to be relocated in the most productive 
country, through a transfer of the available productive factors. The latter, 
moreover, seems much closer to the modern globalized world with the 
ever-expanding presence of multinational corporations (Cho & Moon, 
2000). 
However, the most fundamental here is another issue. There is no doubt 
that the classical theoretical framework of the 18th century understood 
fruitfully that the profitability of the capitalist enterprise constitutes the 
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developmental engine of capitalism (Zouboulakis, 2015). Moreover, we can 
also argue that this necessary profit for the survival of capitalism cannot 
exist sufficiently and long-term within any entrenched national economic 
field. According to Formaini (2001, p. 9):  
“In the very competitive, global market-place, nations that forget how 
their entrepreneurs contribute to technological change, productivity, 
resource efficiencies, and economic growth do so at a potentially high 
cost.” 
We also must note the interpretative limits on this point. Overall, for the 
classical political economy, the leading category in its analysis remained 
the concept of the nation-state: The conception of the operation of 
capitalism here is “inter-national” and not global (Forsgren & Yamin, 2010, 
Michalet, 1985a). As well as the fact that the only parameter of its analysis 
in terms of international flows was international trade: the flow of 
migration, technology, capital, and productive investment from country to 
country were not examined internally. However, some also argue that the 
nation-state concept in Adam Smith was actually in a transitional form: 
“one that has already begun to need replacement in his day” (Berdell, 1998, p. 
175). 
In this context, it has already been fully perceivable that the “export” of 
national capitalism is a phenomenon, ultimately, inevitable for all capitalist 
socioeconomic formations in the prospect of their development. This 
outward movement of national capitalism happens because of the very 
logic of the capitalist economy: the pursuit of entrepreneurial profit. In this 
sense, the words of Schumpeter (1939, p. 104) that “In a stationary economy, 
even if disturbed by action of external factors, both the entrepreneurial function 
and the entrepreneurial profit would be absent” seem to express that 
adequately. 
This critical realization is therefore profoundly inscribed on the 
foundations of economic science, in the classical political economy: and 
indeed, this is not something “so novel and untried,” as some wish to 
present nowadays. Apart from its undeniable interpretive wealth, the 
classical political economy did not have the time to give detailed and 
definitive answers regarding the future of global capitalism, as it remained 
trapped in the analysis of the “inter-national” economy. This fact is 
undoubtedly justified if we adopt a historical perspective: it was de facto 
impossible in the classical era for economic theory to observe things 
beyond the nation-state. However, did the neoclassical continuation of 
classical political economy manage to do that? We doubt it. 
 
4. The neoclassical synthesis: a fertile continuation or 
sterilization of the classical political economy?  
The neoclassical way of perceiving the world economy (discussed 
nowadays broadly under the term globalization) seems to lead toward 
some acute and contrasting views and criticisms: 
• According to Choudhury, Al-Ghamdi, & Umar (2002, p.6):  
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“Contrary to the methodology of independence and individualism 
that emanates from neoclassical economic theory … globalization is 
not a mere economic process. It is a vastly interdependent system 
between interacting markets and institutions that together take stock 
of the interests of powerful world governance under which 
development financing institutions, instruments and economy 
combine in perpetuating the interests of owners of capital and 
resources.” 
• Agmon (2010, p.293) studies globalization under the prism of the 
neoclassical theory and suggests that:  
“The neoclassical model of international trade with the ‘small country’ 
assumption, the emphasis on the competitive advantage of the firm as 
the basis for the comparative advantage of the country and the 
balance of payments as the measuring device seems to be a natural 
model for an inquiry of globalization from the point of view of small 
countries and emerging markets.”  
As Agmon concludes (2010, p.313), one of the implications of 
this neoclassical analysis is the study of “a successful 
implementation of a new comparative advantage in a given country 
on the stability over time of the relations between firms from this 
country and MNEs from developed countries?”  
• Atanasov (2013) argues that the “expected utility hypothesis” 
“degenerates” in a Lakatosian sense (that is, according to Lakatos, 1968, 
a new and more progressive system of theories should be sought to 
replace the currently prevailing one). The expected utility hypothesis is 
used, among others, in game theory and decision theory, and measures 
the expected utility an actor or an aggregate economy can reach based 
on a number of criteria. According to Atanasov (2013, p.31), this 
hypothesis constitutes the “inherent operating theoretical and methodological 
core of contemporary neoclassical economics.” According to the author: “the 
current official neoclassical doctrine … did not predict such new fact as the 
global economic crisis. As a rule, warnings and anticipations of such crisis 
phenomena came from the heterodox critique.” As a result, it is argued that 
this relative degeneration of the “expected utility theory” indicates that 
a “global” neoclassical economics has inherent methodological 
problems. 
• Subsequently, Zang (2016, p.96) tries to “develop a neoclassical 
economic growth model with multiple (any number of) countries in the world 
economy and multiple (any number of) regions in each country to explain 
economic mechanisms and dynamics of economic globalization with spatial 
agglomeration within a compact analytical framework.” Zang (2016, p.114) 
concludes specifically that this model was “built under assumptions of 
profit maximization, utility maximization, and perfect competition” and that it 
“deals with dynamic interactions among international trade, national and 
global growth, interregional migration, wealth accumulation and regional 
amenities.” 
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The above approaches constitute only a small representative sample of 
the current scientific critique for the connection between the neoclassical 
paradigm and the dynamics of globalization. What stands out is, on the one 
hand, the static modeling and the maximization hypothesis of the 
neoclassical paradigm in an attempt to interpret the “dynamic” of 
globalization and, on the other, direct criticism of its methodological 
assumptions. But how did we get here? 
Initially, P. Samuelson (1949) seems to have coined the term 
“neoclassical synthesis” to characterize the theoretical consensus formed in 
the first postwar years, among orthodox conservative economists. This 
synthesis included in its foundations, both the flow of the traditional 
neoclassical microeconomics and the macroeconomic theory developed by 
Keynes (1936). The traditional neoclassical school, which preceded 
Samuelson’s synthesis, can be divided into four distinct but largely 
converging streams of economic thought: in the English school, with 
Jevons, Edgeworth, Wicksteed and Marshall, the Vienna school of Menger 
and Bοhm-Bawerk, the Lausanne School of Walras and Pareto, and the 
French school of Cournot, Navier, and Dupuit. 
 The subsequent neoclassical theory, which studies international 
transactions, is based on some fundamental and irreplaceable analytical 
assumptions. This neoclassical hypothesis incorporates the international 
trade analysis model of Heckscher and Ohlin, as perfected by Samuelson 
(the so-called HOS model). This model is based on the theorem of the so-
called “endowment” of national factors of production that each nation has 
in a, supposedly, “static” way. This theorem also generates the rule that 
every country necessarily has to specialize in the production and export of 
those products that use that relative abundant factor of production (see 
mainly for the basics of this theoretical framework: Ohlin, 1933). 
The HOS analysis accepts the foundational directions of Ricardian 
theory, although in a bit different way: the assumption that the production 
functions for a given product between different countries are identical. This 
assumption presupposes, implicitly, an automatic diffusion of technology 
internationally (Perilla Jimenez, 2019) which, of course, has little to do with 
reality. In fact, if the HOS model assimilates the realistic assumption that 
the production technology used may vary from country to country to 
produce a given commodity, then the definition of national “endowment” 
in productive factors loses all explanatory power. 
This hypothesis is, in fact, a very restrictive analytical grid that excludes 
neoclassical economics from any essential possibility of a fruitful approach 
to globalization’s evolutionary trajectory. In particular, the neoclassical 
tradition establishes its approach to the following six central working cases 
(for a recent and older critique of neoclassical theory, see also: Coad, 2010; 
Ghazinoory, Narimani, & Tatina 2017; Nelson & Winter 1974): 
i. The inability to move production factors from country to country;  
ii. The prevalence of the perfect market competition; 
C. Vlados, JEPE, 6(3), 2019, p.257-280. 
265 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
iii. Static international specialization in production where technology is 
taken for granted and “open to all” without restrictions. This logic 
drives, supposedly, directly to the optimization of the distribution of 
production factors, in free-market conditions, on an international level. 
This model, thus, perceives the factors of production as immobilized 
within their national frameworks while the trade of goods substitutes 
any need for transferring capital from nation to nation (for a 
comprehensive overview of the theoretical framework of International 
Economics see: Krugman & Obstfeld, 1994); 
iv. In the firm’s perception as an automatic transformer of market 
“signals” (Jaeckel, 2015; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Nooteboom, 2008); 
v. Denying any institutional dimension to the functioning of the 
economy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Hodgson & Lamberg, 2018); 
vi. A fully flatten historical dimension of the partial spatial 
socioeconomic formations (Boschma & Frenken, 2006; Freeman, 2019). 
In this direction, on the foundations of the theoretical construction of 
neoclassical synthesis, policy-makers and economists alike built the so-
called “Washington Consensus.” This term refers, in particular, to John 
Williamson’s (1993) description of the “consensus” in the developed and 
less developed capitalistic economies, among the officials that formulated 
national economic policies and decision-makers in international 
organizations (notably through the International Monetary Fund –IMF). 
This “consensus” to the virtues of the “neo-liberal model” of 
development brought some inherent problems. According to Βλάδος 
(2006), this particular policy of “neo-liberal consensus” was far away from 
an authentic and comprehensive liberal model regulating the global 
economy and society. In practice, in the vast majority of its applications, 
this largely spurious “liberal” policy: 
• While evangelized, on the surface, a reduction in the weight of 
national state interventionism through the reduction of public spending 
and taxes, in the background, very often it was driven to a significant –
although silent– increase, supposedly, of the “strategic” presence of the 
state. This presence was most frequently one that supported some 
strong vested national interests (public and private) and continued 
reproducing intensively in a large number of national socioeconomic 
formations, more or less developed. 
• While proclaimed its full support for the private initiative, it 
demonstrated in practice many times that it managed to perceive as a 
private initiative, completely hypocritically, only the initiative of some 
“big fish.” Thus, often, when it was proposing large privatizations 
programs, it showed that it perceived superficially the privatization 
process as the simple transition of ownership from a state monopoly to 
another monopoly, “friendly” private, without any prior systematic 
development of the conditions for the widening of real competition. 
• While it flagged as crucial the “deregulation” –that is, the radical 
reduction of restrictive national state regulations in the general 
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economic action–, it usually resulted into a tacit reproduction of both 
strong commercial protectionism and privileges of several “national 
champions.” 
Not all these, of course, can describe the true meaning of liberalism: they 
do not constitute in any way a comprehensive global liberal program, 
necessarily at the same time political, social, and economic. Moreover, this 
“Washington consensus” (Rodrik, 2006) policy proved increasingly 
problematic since it failed to provide global regulation solutions for the 
world economy and could not effectively face the emergence of the 
challenges of the developing globalization of the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Moreover, many people continue to think, even today, that globalization is 
something “inherently destructive” precisely because of this precarious 
consensus. 
In fact, at the root of the imperfections of the “Washington consensus,” 
we argued that lie the very inadequacies of the traditional neoclassical 
vision of the global economy. In particular, we argued that there were at 
least three main points of containment, which constitute the intellectual 
deficits of neoclassical economics versus a sufficient understanding of 
globalization: 
I. Neoclassical economics studies the partial economic dimensions of 
globalization only fragmentarily and in the absence of a unifying 
socioeconomic theoretical framework. 
II. It generates some profoundly “unhistorical” conceptions of 
economic, political, and social phenomena. 
III. It keeps itself locked-in in a mostly silent, but rigid, nation-centered 
analysis and ethnocentrism. 
Today, these reservations against this set of policies seem to be 
confirmed by the reality, since the Washington consensus seems largely 
neglected, for a variety of reasons. Such as the rise of populism in the US 
(Löfflmann, 2019), the “long‐term structural violence produced by the old 
consensus and global capitalism” that give birth gradually to a “New 
Washington Consensus” (Mitchell & Sparke, 2016, p. 744) or the enormous 
economic growth of China, which seems to create now, respectively, 
“Beijing Consensus” (Chen, 2017). 
But what is the actual link between the classical political economy and 
the neoclassical model? A particularly “unfortunate” thing in the history of 
classical political economy is that most “official continuers” of this flow of 
economic thought followed the path of interpretive standardization, 
simplification, and rigidity. In fact, in this way: 
• The flow of thought of the classical political economy was led –
almost exclusively and in a sterile way– to linear modeling and 
superficial analysis of market balances and nothing more. As J. Stiglitz 
(2002, p. 219) rightly argues:  
“Adam Smith was far more aware of the limitations of the market, 
including the threats posed by imperfections of competition, than 
those who claim to be his latterday followers. Smith too was more 
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aware of the social and political context in which all economies must 
function.” 
• The worst is that its trust in the initiative and freedom of the 
responsible man was haphazardly misrepresented by so many 
“supporters” of liberal thinking, as supposedly enforcing the principle 
of “the weak are meat the strong do eat.” In this respect, let us quote A. 
Smith (1776, p.70) again by saying that “No society can surely be 
flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and 
miserable.” 
Therefore, it seems that the neoclassical tradition misrepresented the fact 
that liberalism has an essential and social sensibility from its fundamental 
worldview. However, many commentators nowadays continue to try 
incessantly to make us believe that liberalism is, supposedly by definition, 
the ideology of extreme “social insensitivity.” Indeed, many “continuers” 
distorted the belief of liberal economics in the value of individuality, often 
reaching the point to forge prevailing ideologies that, in essence, support 
the view of a “myopic individualism.” Therefore, the global ideological 
political dialogue managed to camouflage at least two central “cosmo-
theoretical” axes of genuine humanitarian liberal thinking: 
i. The human dimension of social empathy –inherent in the economic 
vision of A. Smith– was silenced, which does not cease to be always in 
direct contradiction with the narrow egotism, as many supposedly 
“liberal” modern thinkers appear ready to accept completely foolishly, 
and  
ii. In this thinking, the essential content of liberal altruism vanishes: 
and we do not mean here the use of any pompous and superficial 
demonstration of “philanthropy.” 
To sum up, the neoclassical theory, until today and despite all these 
issues and its real disconnection from classical economics, manages to 
maintain the dominant position in the “orthodoxy” of economic science 
(Peneder, 2017). Moreover, it continues to be the “main scientifically 
responsible” theory in the issues of international trade and investment, and 
“thus” and in the issues of “globalization.” However, a perspective that is 
based on the specific history of phenomena, which tries to study all the 
socioeconomic actors in their co-evolution, as opposed to neoclassical 
economics, is studied now under the prism of evolutionary economics. In 
the next section, therefore, we will try to find out see what seems to be an 
evolutionary approach to the globalization phenomenon. 
 
5. Counterproposal to the neoclassical synthesis: To an 
evolutionary perspective of global dynamics 
The most common conception within the post-war neoclassical synthesis 
is the constant replication of their self-restraint in the stifling boundaries of 
some partial specialization. It is usually attempted an “incorporation” of 
the overall problem of globalization carelessly, into the narrow suit of some 
entrenched thematic of economic science (finance, international trade, 
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marketing, or accounting standards) (Landmann, 2014; Mazzocchi, 2013; 
Weeks, 2012). 
“Globalization” becomes superficially perceived as a mechanical sum of 
disparate and incoherent pieces, never as a historically evolving organic 
ensemble, never as a distinct historical phase of the evolution of capitalism, 
with a start and, necessarily, with some inevitable structural 
transformations and mutations during the unfolding. In a more profound 
criticism, Labini (2016, p.89) argues that “the society is not ... a sum of rational 
agents seeking to maximize their income in competition with each other, as 
assumed by the neoclassical theory, but rather it is a complex organization.” 
Moreover, on the issue of an organic versus a mechanic analysis, Dopfer & 
Potts (2008, p.2) notice that: “mechanistic analysis has only limited powers to 
explain the complex open processes of coordination and change in the economy.” 
Most of the time, the only “new” which this usual mechanistic, 
fragmentary, and infertile over-focused modern research logic produces is: 
• Some extremely homogenizing and, at the same time, completely 
vague, timeless and unhistorical approaches to globalization. 
Approaches which, ultimately, want to say everything in a single word, 
but they do not eventually say anything new and substantial (such as, 
for example, do some modern analyses in terms of marketing, which 
originate from the relevant theoretical work of T. Levitt, 1983, and 
describe “strictly” the supposedly devastating advent of globalization 
through the “global product”). 
• Either some extremely one-dimensional and sporadic conceptions of 
globalization, which are reproducing theoretically their supposedly 
“unique,” necessary, and sufficient explanatory factor (for example, they 
observe globalization as equal to information technology flows and 
nothing more). 
These approaches keep missing the incessantly evolving nature of 
globalization as described by new, mostly evolutionary, approaches 
(Bhattacharya, Khanna, Schweizer, & Bijapurkar, 2017; Laudicina & 
Peterson, 2016; Lauridsen, 2018; Vlados, Deniozos, & Chatzinikolaou, 2018).  
One of the first schools of thought that criticized thoroughly the 
simplification of the neoclassical school of thought, although it provided 
nation-centered rather than global analyses (except for a few exceptions 
internally: Delapierre, Moati, & Mouhoud, 2000; Lesourne, Orléan, & 
Walliser 2006; Michalet, 1985b; Orléan 2009) was the French School of 
Regulation (Aglietta, 1997; Boyer, 1986). This “heterodox” theoretical 
scheme seems to understand better the inherent nature of socioeconomic 
crises. According to Boyer & Saillard (1995, p.175):  
“In heterodox approaches to the economic dynamic the modelling of 
endogenous fluctuations is a constant … Without underestimating the 
effects of exogenous shocks, the concept of a minor crisis emphasizes 
the fact that the original disequilibria and the fluctuations to which 
they give rise are endogenous.” 
Guttmann (2015, p.195), who examines the notion of structural crisis in 
“heterodox approaches,” argues that:  
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“Given that structural crisis seems a recurrent phenomenon, albeit 
one spaced decades apart, we may place it within a long-wave 
dynamic defining the rhythms of capitalist evolution over the longer 
run.” 
Contrary to the neoclassical view, then, newer currents in modern 
socioeconomic sciences argue, either implicitly or explicitly, that we are 
now facing an overall crisis and restructuring of globalization (Vlados, 
Deniozos, Chatzinikolaou, & Demertzis, 2018; Vlados, Deniozos, & 
Chatzinikolaou, 2019b). In the background, it is argued that the very 
concept of crisis and development can be distinguished between a 
superficial and coincidental approach (for example, in the neoclassical 
interpretation) and a structural/evolutionary perspective. In this direction: 
• A superficial perspective analyses the notion of crisis as an 
emergency that has to be dealt as soon as possible. The crisis usually 
constitutes an exogenous disorder that is abnormal and occasionally 
disrupts the system’s balanced course. In this “conjunctural” 
perspective, the system is about to assimilate the crisis and return to its 
former state. 
• On the other hand, in the structural perspective, the crisis is an 
expected situation that, eventually, would occur. The crisis is an 
endogenous disorder that disrupts the equilibrium of the system in a 
“physiological” and organic way. In this structural perception of the 
crisis, the system and its particular historical and institutional 
equipment in its present form cannot absorb the new qualitative features 
of the crisis, and thus always an inherently different new systemic 
trajectory is formed. 
Modern evolutionary economics seems to follow a converging analytical 
direction, traces of which can be found back to the work of classical 
economists who studied the historical outline of institutions and human 
culture (Hamilton, 2017). Specifically, in the years following the 
breakthrough in evolutionary thought brought by Darwin’s Origin of 
Species, writers such as Veblen and Marshall began to translate biological 
analogies into economic analysis, although without describing a systematic 
framework of an evolutionary economic change (Foster, 1997; Hodgson, 
2002). 
Influenced by the neoclassical tradition, J. Schumpeter (1939, 1942) was 
the first economist to systematize this evolutionary change in economics. 
He describes a framework of general “equilibrium,” which is, in fact, the 
“stable” and dialectical nature of circularity in the economy, where 
prosperity itself cultivates the background for its future catastrophe. In this 
sense, Schumpeter’s work bears a historical and evolutionary meaning. 
Although Schumpeter (1954, p.756) opposed biological analogies in 
economic science, the Neo-Schumpeterian work of Nelson & Winter (1982) 
articulates biological metaphors to explain the behavior of the capitalist 
firm, arguing that evolutionary economics and its models are dynamic in 
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nature and must take into account a large number of different scenarios 
and parameters. 
Alongside the Neo-Schumpeterian perspective of evolutionary 
economics, which focuses on the discontinuity of the system and the role of 
the entrepreneur in economic change and innovation (Andersen, 2009), the 
second stream of thought is undoubtedly the institutional one that 
originates from Veblen’s contribution (Veblen, 1898). Although it seems 
that the early followers of “institutionalism” did not construct a 
comprehensive interpretation of technological change, by dividing their 
thinking between technology and institutions (Brett, 1973), new streams of 
institutional economics today reconnect institutionalism with the 
contributions of evolutionary economics (Hodgson, 1998). 
Another stream of modern evolutionary economics rests on the 
contributions of the Austrian school of thought, drawing mainly on Carl 
Menger’s theory of “natural” formation of money. The “spontaneous 
order” of institutions that the Austrian school supports, directly or 
indirectly, tends to be self-identified as evolutionary, since it takes a long 
historical process for the institutions to be created (Hayek, 1967; Kwasnicki, 
1999; Mises, 1949, 1957). 
Here, the approach of Nelson et al. (2018, pp.3-4) on how economic 
science evolves and the role that innovation has, is a typical example of the 
questions that evolutionary economics has to answer nowadays. In this 
context, a neoclassical theorization does not seem able to respond 
sufficiently: 
 “At the root of the difference between evolutionary economics and 
economics of the sort presented in today’s standard textbooks is the 
conviction of evolutionary economists that continuing change, largely 
driven by innovation, is a central characteristic of modern capitalist 
economies, and that this fact ought to be built into the core of basic 
economic theory. Economies are always changing, new elements are 
always being introduced and old ones disappearing. Of course 
economic activities and economic sectors differ in the pace and 
character of change. In many parts of the economy innovation is rapid 
and continuing, and the context for economic action taking is almost 
always shifting and providing new opportunities and challenges. And 
while in some activities and sectors the rate of innovation is more 
limited, attempts at doing something new are going on almost 
everywhere in the economy, and so too change that can make obsolete 
old ways of doing things. Neoclassical theory, which is a significant 
influence on how most professionally trained economists think, 
represses this. For evolutionary economists perhaps the most 
challenging and important economic questions that need to be 
addressed are: How did the economic progress we have achieved 
come about? What can be done to enable those societies that to date 
have not shared in economic progress to do better? And what kind of 
progress can we expect in the future, and how can we influence the 
paths taken?” 
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Therefore, although neoclassical models appear to have internal logical 
coherence and integrity as a tool, this seems to be no longer sufficient in 
analytical terms because, in particular: 
I. The productive factors (capital, natural resources, technology, and 
entrepreneurship, and to some extent, the labor) no longer have strict 
national boundaries.  
II. Complicated forms of imperfect competition –in particular, the 
increasingly developed forms of globalized oligopolistic competition– 
dominate on a global scale.  
III. The international specialization of production is always changing, 
by acquiring an evolutionary content, and within an increasingly dense 
systemic environment of interdependencies, where the diversification of 
technology is galloping. 
IV. The firm as an entity is proving to be a complex, evolutionary, and 
adaptive subject, which resembles mostly a living organism. 
V. The institutions acquire an increasingly critical impact on the 
dynamics of the growth-crisis of individual economies. 
VI. The historical specificity and trajectory of each socioeconomic 
format are crucial to the process of integration into globalization. 
That is why it should not be surprising that the criticism of neoclassical 
economic thinking has also happened in theoretical spaces traditionally 
quite “conventional.” Gilpin (2001, p.103), for example, has argued that:  
“Although neoclassical economics is extremely useful in static 
analysis, it does not provide an adequate conceptual framework for 
the analysis and understanding of economic change and the dynamics 
of the global economy; for example, it cannot explain the exogenous 
factors such as changes in taste and technology that are important in 
understanding the long-term dynamics of an economy.”  
Notably, the new neoclassical field of production of fragmented 
approaches of globalization includes in a privileged way those who come 
to explicitly render their interpretative paramountcy (and often the full 
exclusivity), for the understanding of globalization in the partial 
international economic flows. According to Aspers & Kohl (2015, p.41), 
“The neoclassical economic model presents the idea of convergence of prices and 
products all over the world, as a result of arbitrage and the clearing of markets.” 
Therefore, “globalization” appears usually in a fragmented way, as trade 
flows, flows of people and labor, production flows, technological flows, 
capital flows, which transcend the borders of two countries, and nothing 
more. Only the bi-national economic flows, supposedly, play a role in 
globalization: as far as the underlying socioeconomic structures are 
concerned, which primarily produce these flows, there is usually absolute 
silence.  
Overall, for the neoclassical tradition, there is no explicit and integrated 
theoretical bond between the economy, politics, and society. Its traditional 
ambition for “absolute universality” of its findings suppresses any attempt 
in its interior towards a unifying assessment of the socioeconomic 
trajectories that the unified socioeconomic dynamics synthesize through 
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the historical space-time. In this sense, the fluctuations and the constant 
differentiation (convergence and deviations) of all these economic flows, as 
reflected in international statistics, constitute only partial manifestations of 
a much deeper and qualitatively new global reality in progress (Delapierre 
& Milelli, 1995). 
To summarize, it is evident that the dominant neoclassical approaches of 
globalization, because of their deeper theoretical foundations, cannot 
understand the changes that are taking place today in terms of 
globalization.  
That is why we argue, straightforwardly, that the modern economic 
science of globalization: 
• It must, gradually, try to free itself from the sporadic and incoherent 
focus on the diverse socioeconomic phenomena it is studying; 
• It should avoid both overly vague and overly “specialized” 
interpretative approaches; 
• It must systematically deepen its analysis in overall socioeconomic 
and historical terms by perceiving the undergoing path-dependence at 
all levels for the actors of the global system. 
Economic, technological, political, and social phenomena produced by 
globalization and, at the same time, they produce it in a dialectic, 
uninterrupted manner. An economic science of globalization, therefore, 
must overcome the narrow nation-centered prism of understanding the 
contemporary globalized reality: to see closer what unifies the partial 
socioeconomic formations beyond geographical boundaries. 
Any valid response to the complex questions posed by the modern 
expression of the global dynamics of capitalism cannot be one-dimensional. 
On the contrary, its essential study imposes certain direct methodological 
excesses of some very common analytical oversimplifications: 
• Any valid approach to the historical phase of globalization 
inevitably leads to the inclusion and co-examination of a vast number of 
different cases and interchanging variables, which date back 
interpretatively to the central part of almost all disciplines of modern 
social sciences. 
• In practice, the study of globalization cannot withstand any 
thematic “unilateralization” and any narrow or “fossilized” 
specialization. Globalization, after all, requires from its sincere scholar 
an approach beyond any incidental manifestations and expressions and 
an effort to try dealing with it as a dialectical entity (Vlados, Deniozos, & 
Chatzinikolaou, 2019a). Dialectical entity means that the global system is 
itself as a whole an always qualitatively transformed set of phenomena, 
an incessantly evolving organic system, of factors and forces: it is not, in 
any way, a static or finished mechanistic summation. 
• The understanding of global capitalist dynamics is, eventually, an 
incessantly “moving target.” 
Overall, the dynamic of the current historical phase of the global 
economy that we call globalization is a highly complex systemic reality in a 
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continuous structural evolution, which is not, by its nature, susceptible to 
any one-dimensional or final definition. Since this resembles an ever-
transforming “river” without a predetermined course and riverbed 
(Graham, 2009; Roy, 2018), no schematic and repetitive way of its 
conception could interpret it thoroughly (Zeleny, 2010). In practice, the 
very dynamic of the development of globalization imposes a constant effort 
of theoretical adaptation to the new realities: a constant effort to modernize 
our theoretical perception of it, which will undoubtedly become 
progressively more and more complex to claim credibility and validity in 
its conclusions. 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
In this article, we attempted a critical overview of classical economics, 
through the works only of Smith and Ricardo, of how neoclassical 
followers interpreted and continued this stream of thought and how, 
ultimately, neoclassical tradition fails to explain the contemporary issues 
raised by the phenomenon of globalization. To this end, we analyzed and 
presented a theoretical counterproposal to the neoclassical view of 
globalization, arguing that we now need an evolutionary approach to 
comprehend the phenomenon of globalization. 
We see that many of the fertile elements of the classical political 
economy (the historic interpretation, the perception of class struggle –
which of course is not only of Marxist origin–, the comprehensive 
socioeconomic reasoning and the non-separation between the “economic” 
and the “political”), were excluded progressively in the development of the 
neoclassical perception. To sum up our critique in the neoclassical 
foundations, the neoclassical theory, in the background, cannot avoid the 
theoretical sterilization of at least three main analytical dimensions of the 
dynamics of globalization: that is why it appears, nowadays, wholly 
saturated in interpretive level: 
1. It sterilizes the dimension of the central actors of globalization: 
• The private firm, in it, performs a static function of production and 
nothing more. 
• Institutional interventions of social regulation actors (state and other), 
at each level of operation of the system, are put on the margins.  
• The historical dynamics of the spatially established socioeconomic 
systems are insignificant in theoretical terms. 
2. It sterilizes the dimension of socioeconomic areas that globalization 
itself unifies progressively: 
• Economic phenomena are separate by the social phenomena 
analytically, internally of the neoclassical approach. 
• It perceives the narrow economic phenomena as always entirely 
trapped in a rigid ethnocentric perspective. 
• The analytical dimension of the nation-state is not one of the many 
necessary levels of analysis (local, national, regional, global) for the 
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neoclassical tradition: The national level remains in most cases the 
strict, exclusive basis. 
3. It sterilizes the dimension of an increasingly subversive sectoral 
innovation in globalization: 
• New technology, in the neoclassical tradition, equates fruitlessly, 
usually, with the new capital equipment and nothing more (in the 
absence of the provisions of knowledge, experience, and learning). 
• For the greatest part of neoclassical economics, new technology within 
the context of sectoral competition appears suddenly: it “falls from the 
sky.” And remains strictly exogenous (some significant and 
particularly interesting exceptions begin from the contribution of 
Romer, 1990, on endogenous development). 
• Innovation also means, in most of the relevant analyses usually and 
rigidly, only new machinery. 
• Ultimately, the notion of the crisis remains a theoretical dimension “to 
be avoided” rather than the fundamental basis of any theory 
concerning the essential study of the production of the new. 
Most of the modern variants of the neoclassical synthesis preserve and 
reproduce this mixed, common theoretical root. A common theoretical 
root that combines: 
• On the one hand, the dominant simplistic neoclassical microeconomic 
aspect, where the firm becomes completely sterile, perceived as a static 
and timeless input transformer into outputs, without any strategic 
prospect and action and, 
• On the other, the ethnically introvert traditional macro-economy. Here, 
the exploration of partial macroeconomic phenomena links them rarely 
with a supranational and deeper socioeconomic, institutional 
perspective, and interpretation. 
We think that all these analytical constraints remove, largely, from the 
“modern” branches of the neoclassical school the possibility of an accurate 
theoretical understanding of the dynamics of globalization. In practice, 
conventional neoclassical thinking is now becoming alienated from the 
modern globalized world and, indeed, at all levels of its dialectical 
processes. 
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